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TOWARDS MORE CONSISTENT, ALBEIT DIVERSE, RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS 
ACROSS BANKS
Following the financial crisis, the new regulatory framework will increase the level and 
quality of capital ratios for the banking system. However, in order to achieve an accurate 
risk measurement that allows for proper comparability of these capital ratios, the 
consistency of risk-weighted assets (RWA) across institutions and geographies acquires 
more relevance than ever. Advances on this issue have been relatively scarce until now, 
whereas empirical evidence points to significant divergences in RWA density across 
banks, not only between the US and Europe but also within Europe. In this article, we 
review the main determinants behind these differences, concluding that while risk profile 
and risk management are justifiable factors behind observed divergences, a necessary 
quantification of their precise impact is pending and complicated. Other elements are 
easier to address and could contribute to attaining more consistency in RWA in a relatively 
short period of time. In particular, two possible courses of action are considered. On the 
one hand, more comparable disclosure in Pillar 3 would allow for effective market discipline. 
On the other hand, more international coordination among supervisors, mainly in the 
validation and approval processes of internal risk-based models, would be beneficial.
The regulatory reform undertaken by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision following 
the financial crisis has significantly increased the level and quality of capital requirements for 
the financial system.1 However, the bulk of the reform has focused on capital, with minor 
changes in the denominator of the ratios, i.e., the risk-weighted assets (RWA). The experience 
prior to the crisis shows that competition for capital across banks was very aggressive and 
entailed different areas, with RWA not being an exception. The downward trend in RWA in 
percentage of total assets during the last decade, barely adjusted during the crisis, combined 
with persistent discrepancies across banks, points to the need for addressing the issue of 
RWA consistency before the new regulation for capital comes into force. Going forward, in a 
framework of tougher requirements, an accurate comparability of capital ratios becomes 
more relevant than ever. In addition, more aggressive competition for capital must not be 
discarded. Against this backdrop, the aim of all economic agents should be to preserve a fair 
risk valuation through a consistent framework for RWA. This framework could pursue two 
objectives. On the one hand, it should preserve the differences in risk profile and risk 
management across banks, creating incentives for more prudent risk-taking. On the other 
hand, undue divergences across entities and jurisdictions should be minimized. 
The debate on the consistency of RWA across banks and geographies has been very subdued 
until very recently. However, several factors have underscored this matter as a priority.
First, the expected transition of the US financial system towards Basel III2 has emphasized 
the substantial divergences in the ratio of RWA versus total assets between the US and 
Europe. Even though accounting rules and different business models could play a major 
role in explaining these divergences, the lack of detailed and comprehensive research on 
this issue has cast doubts on which other factors also determine part of these discrepancies. 
This issue was particularly conveyed by James Dimon, JP Morgan’s CEO and Chairman: 
“RWA has to be done fairly around the globe … [risk weighting is] 70% of our assets…
1 Introduction
1  See BCBS (2010).
2  The US financial system has firstly to adopt Basel II. Nonetheless, even after this implementation, expected for 
coming months, significant differences with Europe will remain.
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adjusting for accounting differences, in Europe it is like half of that. So some banks have 
far more aggressive risk-weighted asset calculators than we do. That has got to be done 
fairly too.” In order to avoid unnecessary doubts regarding this issue, some work has to be 
done to disentangle the factors behind these discrepancies. 
Second, in recent months, an increase in domestic capital requirements beyond the 
forthcoming minimum required by Basel III has been carried out or considered in some 
countries due to different reasons ranging from crisis management to reinforcement of 
solvency for large institutions. This is the case of several European countries, among them 
Switzerland, Sweden, Spain and the UK. In this framework, the consistency of RWA across 
jurisdictions acquires more relevance than ever. There is a likelihood that, after adjusting 
by risk profiles, a very high capital ratio in one country will not be as stringent as a 
supposedly more moderate one in another, for example. Moreover, the upcoming capital 
add-ons, such as that for systemic risk, calculated in terms of RWA, will add pressure for 
greater comparability of RWA across jurisdictions.
Third, the use of internal-risk based (IRB) models for some banks and supervisors over the 
last three years, although it is too soon to properly assess their implementation, has allowed 
some global banks to be aware of significant divergences in risk treatment of the same 
banking products and business lines in different countries. In this vein, doubts mount over 
the consistency of validation and approval processes of these models across countries.
In more general terms, the discussion on the consistency of RWA is frequently linked to the 
use of IRB models. However, at present, with a lack of sufficient evidence on this issue, 
these models should not be converted into the scapegoat of existing shortcomings in the 
assessment of RWA. This is especially true if we take into account that both features, the 
downward trend in RWA density and the persistent discrepancies across banks, occurred 
prior to the implementation of IRB models. 
Finally, the financial crisis underscores the need for proper risk valuation. Higher capital 
surcharges will probably not be enough to avoid financial crises in the future. However, 
incentives for prudent risk management will play a major role in safeguarding financial 
stability. A more consistent framework for RWA, avoiding undue distortions in their 
assessment, will contribute to this target. 
Therefore, whereas there are several reasons that justify a growing focus on RWA, research 
on this issue is still very limited. Apart from some work conducted by regulators and 
supervisors, and empirical evidence provided mainly by financial analysts, there is no 
comprehensive study of RWA determinants. In this article, we focus on the analysis of RWA, 
in both time and cross-sectional dimensions, in order to obtain a better understanding of their 
main determinants. In our view, three main determinants of RWA can be identified: risk profile 
(including business model, macro and institutional factors), risk management and supervisory 
practices. Arguably, divergences in RWA across banks and jurisdictions are justifiable because 
of different business models, institutional differences, risk management and recovery 
practices, accounting practices and, finally, modeling choices in the case of IRB models. To 
what extent current divergences are too broad and whether or not there are additional factors 
in these discrepancies are the main issues in assessing the consistency of RWA.
Our main conclusion is that although some divergences are overly justified, there is room for 
improvement in some factors in order to create a level playing-field. In this sense, the RWA 
working group recently launched by the Standards Implementation Group (SIG) in the Basel 
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Committee on Banking Supervision is undoubtedly a step forward in the needed consistency 
in RWA. Having acknowledged that, it should be recognized that the issue is so complex that 
short-term and long-term objectives for this working group should probably be considered. In 
this sense, a feasible and beneficial target could be addressing firstly the existing divergences 
in supervisory practices across countries, and, in particular, those regarding the validation 
and approval processes of IRB models. With this aim, experience accumulated over the last 
three years should be worthwhile. In this sense, knowledge gathered in dealing with IRB 
models offers a unique opportunity for understanding risk and achieving greater consistency 
for RWA. Harmonization of Pillar 3 could also be helpful in order to enhance market discipline.
The structure of this paper is the following: In Section 2, we analyze the empirical evidence 
on the evolution and current developments of RWA. In Section 3, the main determinants of 
RWA are addressed. Section 4 offers some suggestions for greater consistency in RWA. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
Accurate risk valuation requires all the different business lines and products within a bank to be 
qualified in terms of their level of riskiness. If properly done, two important consequences could 
be obtained: the level of capital fitting better with the risk profile of different institutions and each 
bank possessing a good tool for achieving more prudent risk management, thereby improving 
practices in risk appetite and monitoring. Enhancing risk sensitivity was primarily the aim of the 
reform undertaken by Basel II. This was a significant advance compared to Basel I, in which 
capital requirements for each credit exposure was based on predetermined risk weights. 
Broadly considered, it is expected that the ratio of RWA over total assets, a standardized 
measure of the density of RWA within an institution, will evolve over time and across institutions 
reflecting different risk profiles and mutating macroeconomic conditions. This is especially 
true under the Basel II agreement. Against this background, RWA could be analyzed in two 
dimensions: time and cross-sectional. That analysis is the purpose of this section. 
Starting with the time dimension, RWA density has shown a downward trend over the 
years,3 barely modified by the unfolding of the financial crisis in 2007. As shown in Chart 1, 
from the beginning of 2000 to 2010, a weighted average of RWA for a broad sample of US 
and European banks diminished from 44% to 39%. This trend was widespread in all 
jurisdictions. For EMU banks, RWA density diminished from 40 to 33%, for US banks the 
reduction was from 74% to 58%, British banks showed a reduction from 51% to 36%, and 
Swiss banks changed from 25% to 18%. In Chart 2 a wider sample of banks is considered, 
including institutions from Canada, Australia, Japan and continental Europe. The evolution 
is quite similar in all the geographies considered.
This downward trend is most likely related to changes in business models, deviating 
activities from more risk-weighted products and business lines towards less risk-weighted 
activities, regardless of the regulatory framework. In general, a reduction in loan activity 
over total assets has taken place during the last decade in a context of greater competition 
and search for yield that leads to higher diversification of activities on bank balance-
sheets. Due to the fact that credit risk accounts for the bulk of RWA requirements, the 
reduction in total density of RWA over total assets could be partly explained by this 
reduction in loan activity share. Significantly, the introduction of Basel II in 2008 does not 
suppose a change in the evolution of RWA. Whereas a reduction in RWA of three percentage 
points is observed, this change is quite similar in magnitude, for example, to that occurred 
2  Empirical evidence 
regarding RWA
2.1 TIME DIMENSION
3  The evidence shown in this section is obtained from financial statements of different banks, according to their 
reports in different moments of time and under different regulatory regimes: for some countries such as the US, 
Basel I is used for the whole period, whereas European banks moved from Basel I to Basel II in 2008.
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in 2005. In view of these data, there is no clear evidence of a casual relationship between 
the introduction of IRB models and the downward trend in RWA density. 
More remarkable than this persistent downward trend in RWA over total assets is the lack 
of pro-cyclicality of RWA during the crisis. This feature has been widespread, which 
constitutes a significant puzzle. As is well-known, some years ago, broad consensus 
emerged on the additional pro-cyclicality of capital under Basel II in those countries 
committed to applying the new regulation. This issue was pointed out by several authors, 
among them Kashyap and Stein (2004) and Repullo and Suárez (2009). Whereas IRB 
models were considered a significant advance in risk measurement at institutional level, 
their aggregate impact in terms of more cyclicality of capital requirements was under 
question. In fact, these models are supposed to intensify the pro-cyclicality of RWA, due 
to the fact that they are computed as an increasing function of the probability of default 
(PD), loss-given default (LGD) and the exposure at default (EAD).4 All these variables 
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RWA IN PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS FOR US AND EUROPEAN BANKS (a) CHART 1 
SOURCE: Financial reports by individual banks.
a Weighted average of the following banks: for Germany (GR), Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank; for the US (USA), Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JP Morgan, 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Citi Bank; for Spain (SP), Santander and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria; for France (FR), BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole and 
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RWA IN PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS FOR BANKS IN DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHIES (a) CHART 2 
SOURCE: Financial reports by individual banks.
a Weighted average for each country. Apart from banks considered in chart 1, we include the following banks: for Canada (CA), Bank of Nova Scotia, BMO Financial 
Group, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Canadian Western Bank, Royal Bank of Canada and Toronto-Dominion Bank; for Australia (AUS), Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Limited, Commonwealth Bank of Australia Group, National Australia Bank and Westpac Banking Corporation; and, a?nally, for Japan (JAP), 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group and Mizuho Financial Group.  
4  There are other determinants of RWA such as a correlation factor set by regulators as a function of borrower 
type, a one-year probability of solvency, and the remaining maturity of the loan. 
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should increase during downturns, increasing capital requirements and making it more 
difficult for banks to grant loans, thereby supposedly increasing the sensitivity of the 
supply of credit to economic conditions. Mounting concern over this outcome in the period 
prior to the implementation of Basel II leads to significant effort being devoted to mitigating 
the pro-cyclicality of Basel II, especially within the academic world. The article by Gordy 
and Howells (2006) offers two possible ways to reduce pro-cyclicality: either by using 
through-the-cycle adjustment of the default probabilities or by smoothing the resulting 
capital requirements, computed from point-in-time default probabilities. Some regulators 
were also aware of this potential increase in pro-cyclicality and designed monitoring 
processes to identify significant shifts in capital requirements, as was pointed out by 
Benford and Nier (2007) of the Bank of England.
However, the empirical evidence during the crisis has not supported this concern. 
Instead of the expected upward movement, RWA in terms of assets has remained overly 
stable during the worst financial crisis of the last seventy years, albeit decreasing, giving 
rise to their puzzling behavior. Moreover, there have been no significant divergences in 
this path among laggards and leaders in the implementation of Basel II. In retrospect, 
different explanations for this behavior are possible. First, a significant deleveraging 
process may have been undertaken by most institutions, especially focused on more 
risky assets. Second, optimization of RWA through different business strategies could 
possibly have been carried out. Third, the massive use of different techniques for 
mitigating cyclicality could also have played a role. This may have been an over-reaction 
to concerns over excessive pro-cyclicality that dominated in the period prior to the 
implementation of Basel II and, by ill-timed coincidence, to the unfolding of the financial 
crisis. Finally, forbearance of some supervisors in a backdrop of fierce competition for 
capital might also have been present during this period. In this sense, some changes in 
IRB models within a single bank from point-in-time default probabilities to through-the-
cycle calculations in the middle of the crisis could have been considered as a way to 
avoid some upward pressure on RWA. Unfortunately, apart from anecdotal evidence, 
financial institutions have not provided enough information on a regular basis in order to 
gauge the impact on RWA evolution of these potential switches in cycle adjustment 
methodologies during the crisis.
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CUMULATED CHANGE IN TOTAL ASSETS AND RWA DURING THE PERIOD 2007-2010 FOR A SAMPLE 
OF EUROPEAN AND US BANKS (a) 
CHART 3
SOURCE: Financial reports by individual banks.
a  Wells Fargo and Lloyds Banking Group are not included in this Figure. Both of them double their size during this period due to corporate mergers. Banca Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena also increases its size signi?cantly, but in that case without an increase in RWA. For Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the considered change 
refers to the period between 2008 and 2010.  
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In order to better understand the behavior during the crisis, we have plotted the change in 
total assets during the period 2007-2010 against the change in RWA in the same period. 
Some differences emerge, as shown in Chart 3, thereby pointing out different patterns of 
behavior. First, a group of institutions has been in a deleveraging process all through the 
crisis, getting rid of more risky assets, thereby reducing the density of RWA over assets. 
This is particularly the case of Swiss banks, most likely encouraged by their domestic 
authorities. Second, among the banks that have increased in size during the crisis, the 
evolution is significantly different, with reductions or very limited increases in RWA in most 
cases and with just a small group of banks increasing RWA above the rise of their total 
assets. Whether some institutions have achieved a reduction in their risk profile or some 
other factors have helped them in reducing RWA will provide some clues in order to solve 
the puzzle of the cyclical behavior of RWA. 
However, this pattern of behavior should not be considered in isolation from RWA density 
in the period prior to the crisis. Banks embarked on fierce competition for capital most 
likely had very low RWA density and have supposedly been more prone to increasing this 
density throughout the crisis. Nonetheless, empirical evidence does not fully support this 
result. In effect, taking into account the initial level of RWA density, with the exception of 
US banks, where significant reduction of RWA density has occurred, starting from very 
high RWA in terms of GDP, there is no evidence that during the period 2007-2010 a greater 
convergence was undertaken. In particular, European banks show greater divergence than 
before, as illustrated in Chart 4. 
At the same time as the evolution of RWA density shows a clear downward trend over 
the last decade, the differences in the level of RWA over total assets across different 
jurisdictions remain persistent during the whole period. As shown in Chart 5, significant 
divergences occur across different geographies. In fact, divergences among continental 
European institutions are quite remarkable. German and Swiss banks are those with 
lower density of RWA, followed by French and Dutch banks. On the other hand, Spanish 
and Italian banks are those with higher density of RWA. Outside Europe, Australian and, 
to a lesser extent, Japanese banks also display higher RWA than the average. Several 
factors account for these differences, as is shown in the next section. Chief among 
them: risk profiles, risk management and also supervisory practices among different 
geographies. 
2.2  CROSS-SECTIONAL 
DIMENSION
GR1 
GR2 
USA2 
USA3 
USA6 
SP1 
SP2 
FR1 
FR2 
SWT1 
NETH1 
IT1 
IT3 
UK1 
UK2 
FR3 UK4 
UK3 SWT2 
-16 
-14 
-12 
-10 
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80
   
  
% RWA/total assets in 2007 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 R
W
A
 /
 to
ta
l a
ss
et
. 2
00
7-
20
10
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CHART 4 
SOURCE: Financial reports by individual banks.
a For Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the change is computed between 2008 and 2010.
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In other words, whereas over the last few months the focus of RWA divergences has been 
on the transatlantic debate, the issue is noticeably not circumscribed to these two areas. 
Nonetheless, focusing on the debate between the US and Europe, it is remarkable that, 
on average, US banks exhibit higher density of RWA than their European peers. There are 
at least two specific, though not sole, explanations for this divergence, as pointed out 
recently by some institutions in an attempt to answer the above-commented statement 
by James Dimon. 
The first explanation is accounting divergence. Whereas European banks use IFRS, US banks 
release their balance-sheets using US-GAAP. A priori, differences in the impact of both 
accounting principles are difficult to gauge. However, as pointed out by BNP (2011) in a 
recent equity report, some useful information in assessing this factor could be obtained from 
the Deustche Bank summary balance sheet published under both US-GAAP and IFRS. As a 
matter of fact, according to this summary, the total assets of Deustche Bank amounted to 
€1,906 under IFRS in the fourth quarter of 2010. Under US-GAAP, after excluding derivatives 
netting, existing and pending, and reverse repo netting, the adjusted-assets could be €1,210, 
achieving a reduction in the balance-sheet of about 37%. As a result, RWA density would 
increase from the observed 18% to a chart close to 29% when the US accounting standards 
are considered. Applying this calculation to BNP would reduce their total assets from a chart 
of €1,998 bn to €1,612 at the end of 2010. This would account for an increase in its density of 
RWA from the current 30% to 37%. Conversely, adding netting agreements to total assets in 
a US bank such as JP Morgan would increase assets from $2,118 bn to 3,567, reducing its 
RWA density from 55 to 33%. Whereas all these charts are only for illustrative purposes, they 
could indicate that, due to accounting principles, total assets in European banks are 
significantly higher than in US banks, leading to significantly lower density of RWA. After 
adjusting by this factor, a significant part of this divergence would vanish. 
The second explanation for the divergences between the US and Europe is business model. 
Splitting the activity into wholesale and retail banking, risk weights in the wholesale business 
are roughly comparable between the US and Europe. Moreover, the ongoing regulatory 
reform, through the increasing requirements for market risk, securitizations and counterparty 
risk included in Basel 2.5, will lead to greater convergence, albeit incomplete, in this 
business line across banks. As pointed out by BernsteinResearch (2011), European banks 
hold a large share of government bond portfolios which are actually non-RWA consumption. 
However, risk weights for retail banking are the main cause of divergences in RWA as most 
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analyses have underscored, such as those of Citi (2011) and BernsteinResearch (2011). 
Loan breakdown reveals a higher share of mortgages and consumer credit in US banks and 
a lower level of corporate loans than European banks. Regarding mortgages, US banks 
normally securitize a significant portion of their mortgage portfolios, removing best quality 
and low-risk loans from the balance-sheets. Remaining mortgages on their balance-sheets 
are normally those with a lower rating and, as a result, with higher risk weight. With a minor 
but also significant impact, US banks are involved in a credit card business that has a very 
high risk weight. As a result of these two elements, total risk weight in retail banking is 
normally higher in the US than in Europe. 
In sum, the bulk of existing divergences between the US and Europe could be due to 
accounting divergences and business models. Alternative explanations could also be 
considered, such as the magnitude of banking losses in the US, clearly superior during the 
last crisis to the write-downs in the European banking sector, and the implementation of 
Basel II, and as a result, of IRB models in Europe, leading to more room for maneuver in the 
assessment of RWA. The US still has to adopt Basel II. In this process, some differences with 
Europe will still remain, due to the fact that the US has established that it will apply standard 
model floors to IRB models in the measurement of RWA [see, i.e., Federal Reserve (2011)].
After reviewing this cross-sectional evidence, in the following section we address the main 
determinants behind these discrepancies, in order to disentangle to what extent they are 
overly justifiable and to analyze if there is some room for increasing consistency and 
comparability across different banks and jurisdictions. 
Due to the importance of greater consistency of RWA in a world of greater competition for 
capital, the lack of a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of RWA is more important 
than ever. At present, references to this issue are very limited and driven more by 
practitioners than by academic researchers. However, mounting interest among US and 
British regulators is patent, as revealed by recent comments publicly made by some 
regulators. In the UK, A. Haldane (2011) points out that there is a great deal of uncertainty 
about the calculation of PDs in IRB models, thereby creating significant distortions in the 
assessment of capital. He mentions three different exercises in order to better understand 
these differences. The first is the analysis of the mortgage portfolios of two large banks 
simulated under two different distributions for PDs. The second approach is the provision 
of a hypothetical portfolio of sovereign, wholesale and corporate exposure to different UK 
banks in order to calibrate capital requirements. This was an exercise conducted by the 
FSA (2010) and aimed at gauging capital requirements for this portfolio by each institution, 
according to their own estimation of PDs. The results show a significant range of capital 
requirements across different banks, especially for sovereign exposures. Finally, in order 
to gauge the accuracy of RWA, he suggests a review of past evidence taking into account 
losses incurred during the crisis. 
Following the latter approach suggested by Haldane, Chart 6 plots total write-downs for a 
sample of European and US banks during the period 2007-2010 against the average RWA 
during this period. Broadly considered, there is a positive correlation. However, three 
different groups of banks emerge: French and German banks have relative low write-downs 
as well as very low RWA density; Spanish and Italian banks show higher write-downs and 
relatively more RWA density; British and US banks are the worst performers with high write-
downs and elevated RWA density, but in some cases, RWA are lower than the average 
given the level of write-downs. This evidence supports the idea that higher RWA density in 
the US is due to backward losses, which are considerably higher than in other countries. 
3  Main determinants in 
the evolution of RWA
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However, it also points to some deviations in a few countries in relation to the average 
behavior: in particular, higher than expected RWA density in Italy and Spain and the opposite 
in some British and US banks. 
This suggests that other factors should also be considered in order to explain differences 
across banks. 
The diversity of factors behind the evolution of RWA is also emphasized by D. Tarullo 
(2011). Against the background of the high RWA in US banks in comparison to their 
competitors, he recognizes that different risk profiles are not enough to explain ongoing 
disparities. In addition, in the same vein as Haldane, Tarullo underscores the differences in 
the calculation of risk-weighted assets across banks as an area that deserves more 
attention. After welcoming the initiative of a forthcoming peer review process by the SIG, 
he points out the compelling need for an effective comprehensive monitoring process 
which goes beyond simple stocktaking exercises and should develop a suitable mechanism 
to validate RWA under international standards. 
Financial analysts, from his point of view, have also conducted some research on the 
issue of RWA determinants. Chief among them, Keefe, Bruyette and Woods (2011), after 
a detailed analysis of the RWA of different portfolios for a sample of European banks, 
conclude that it is almost impossible to check the appropriate risk weight and put forward 
an extra margin of safety for banks with low risk weights. Focusing as well on European 
banks, Barclays Capital (2011) points to random swings in RWA over time, suggesting 
some scope for subjectivity in RWA calculation. Both analyses underscore the need for 
improving disclosure of Pillar 3, promoting more consistent reporting across institutions, 
in order to enhance market discipline and allow greater comparability in RWA. 
In sum, the identification and analysis of the main determinants of RWA is not an easy 
task. However, we are going to try to classify them into three different groups of factors: 
the first element is the bank risk profile, which encompasses business models and also 
all the institutional and macroeconomic factors that determine risk for the whole financial 
industry within a particular jurisdiction; the second element is risk management in a broad 
sense, including all decisions adopted by banks in relation with risk monitoring, recovery 
practices and modeling choices in the case of those financial institutions embarked on 
IRB models; and, finally, the third element is the role of supervisory practices in different 
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jurisdictions, which is also more crucial for banks that are following IRB models. In the 
next subsections, a brief description of each of the above-mentioned determinants of 
RWA is provided. Whether these factors lead to justifiable divergences in RWA and to 
what extent they should be adjusted in order to avoid undue distortions in the assessment 
of risk weights are the main issues to be scrutinized in this analysis. 
Undoubtedly, each financial institution has a different risk profile. This is the result of the 
combination of several interconnected elements ranging from individual choices such as 
business models to macroeconomic and institutional elements that determine the nature 
of risk undertaken by the bank. In other words, both micro and macro factors determine 
the risk profile of a particular institution. 
Starting with the latter element, institutional factors, different from one jurisdiction to another, 
will lead to legitimate differences in RWA across countries. These divergences encompass 
from legal frameworks such as bankruptcy laws and foreclosure practices to market 
practices such as the existence of specialized lenders in some segments, conventions in 
underwriting standards and the level of competition within the banking sector. Regulatory 
elements are also included in this category: rules regarding the level of LTV or accounting 
policies play a major role in risk profile. A case in point is the role of loan provisions, with 
significant divergences across jurisdictions. Other institutional factors will also alter risk 
profile in a significant manner, such as the existence of a home loan guarantee agency (such 
as Crédit Logement, created in France in 1975 with banks as the main stakeholders), making 
a difference in mortgage risk profile, thereby diminishing average PDs in the mortgage 
portfolio across the board. In fact, French banks in general exhibit lower PDs and LGDs in 
mortgage loans in IRB models than their European peers as shown in Chart 7. In particular, 
PDs for French banks range between 0.3 and 1.0%, much below the average of 1.7% for 
the other banks considered in this sample, those that provided detailed information in their 
Pillar 3 reporting. Although it is reasonable that guarantee schemes will allow for a reduction 
in PDs and, arguably, in LGDs, the extent of this change is not properly calibrated, and 
further work should to be done in order to gauge the impact of this factor. 
Macroeconomic factors will also matter in risk profile within the financial industry. Loss 
rates in different economic sectors, the growth and volatility of GDP and employment and 
the level and volatility of interest rates constitute privileged indicators of the aggregate risk 
profiles of the financial industry in one particular country. 
In addition, individual choices by a company are most likely the principal factors behind 
the evolution of RWA. In particular, the portfolio mix and the geographic mix shape the risk 
profile of each institution. A significant correlation can be found between the share of loan 
portfolio in total assets and the density of RWA. To illustrate this point, we could divide 
RWA over total assets as follows: 
 RWA/TA = (RWACR/L)*(L/BB)*(BB/TA) + (RWAMR/TB) *(TB/TA) + (RWAOP/TA)      [1]
where TA is total assets, BB is the banking book, TB is the trading book, and L is the total 
customer loan exposure. In addition, RWACR is RWA related to credit risk, RWAMR refers to 
market risk and RWAOR to operational risk. Thus, business mix and, mainly, loan portfolio 
over total assets L/TA are important components of RWA in terms of assets. 
Chart 8 shows the breakdown of RWA over total assets for European banks according to 
identity [1], except that the terms L/BB and BB/TA have been aggregated as L/TA for 
3.1 RISK PROFILE
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simplicity. As is shown in this Chart, the first term of identity [1], RWA for credit risk (the 
first two bars in the Chart), is the most important component of RWA. Two elements 
constitute this component: the weight of loans in total assets, reflecting the business 
model, and the credit risk over loans. In particular, business model accounts on average 
for slightly more than 50% of the total RWA density, with significant variations across 
institutions. Almost a third of RWA density is due to the contribution of RWA of credit risk 
in terms of loans, a component which also shows significant deviation across banks. The 
second term of identity [1] is composed of two elements: trading book in terms of total 
assets, with an average contribution of 1.1% to RWA density, and RWA for market risk 
in terms of trading book with less than 0.7% contribution, but still with significant 
differences across banks. Paradoxically, for some banks with a business model more 
focused on banking book, market risk has a relatively higher contribution to RWA density. 
Finally, the last term of identity [1], RWA for operational risk in terms of total assets, has 
an average contribution of 3.5%, with very large dispersion across banks. In conclusion, 
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significant differences in the composition of RWA density are shown, with business 
model being an element that influenced this evolution to a large extent. Below we focus 
in more detail on this factor. 
Thus, Chart 9 again shows RWA density for a broader sample of banks, adding the level of 
loans over total assets. As expected, a correlation between both variables is found. For 
example, German and Swiss banks show the lowest RWA density in combination with a 
low share of loans as a percentage of total assets, followed by French banks. On the other 
hand, some deviations are also very significant. Dutch, Italian, Canadian and Australian 
banks have a very low RWA density in comparison to their elevated loan activity. Exactly 
the opposite happens in the US. 
With a longer-term approach, taking into account the evolution over the last ten years, 
there is a positive relationship between changes in the share of loans and those in RWA 
density. On average, the reduction in RWA density has been significant, whether or not 
institutions diminished the loan portfolio as a percentage of total assets. However, 
deviations to this average behavior are significant. Accordingly, in some cases, as shown 
in Chart 10, increases in loan portfolios have been accompanied by reductions in RWA 
density. This evidence points to the fact that business mix, being an important determinant 
of RWA, is not enough to explain the whole reduction in RWA. 
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Within the credit portfolio, changes in composition also determine significant divergences 
across banks. Banks with a high portion of corporate loans, especially to the SME sector, 
should have a higher RWA density; at least structured finance (i.e., asset-based finance, 
project finance) has been implemented, reducing the total risk of the corporate loan portfolio. 
After reviewing all these factors, an initial conclusion emerges: most of the divergences in 
risk profiles are unavoidable and justifiable and effectively constitute a major determinant 
of differences in RWA. The main issue going forward is the extent of these divergences: 
calibration of the impact of institutional, macroeconomic and business model in RWA is 
not an easy task. A preliminary, and probably simple, approach has suggested that 
existing divergences in RWA within the same type of loan portfolio are too large to be 
explained by these understandable factors.
In order to illustrate this point, Chart 11 shows risk weights used in IRB models for 
different segments of the loan portfolio for a sample of European banks. The Chart shows 
four percentiles of the distribution: 5%, 25%, 75% and 95%. As illustrated, risk weight 
fluctuates between 8 and 30% for this sample of banks in the segment of institutions and 
between 35 and 71% for corporations. In a first approach, both ranges seem too large 
even taking into account all differences in risk profile across financial institutions. 
A similar result is obtained for consumer loans: the range of risk weights fluctuates 
between 8 and 23% for mortgages, 15 and 65% for credit cards and 21 and 88% for 
other consumer loans. Other factors, apart from risk profile, have to be considered in 
order to explain the extent of these differences, and we cannot discard that, even after 
considering these additional factors, a portion of these discrepancies remains unexplained. 
When we plot these risk weights for IRB models against default rates for different 
portfolios from 2010, a positive correlation is found as expected and as seen in Chart 12. 
However, there are significant outliers and the analysis in specific portfolios does not 
always show this positive correlation. In particular, it fails for mortgages, institutions and 
credit cards. 
In addition, as is well-known, whereas the roll-out to IRB models has been significant 
over the last few years, this roll-out is highly diverse across institutions, with some banks 
still keeping a significant amount of their exposures under standard models. For that 
Source: Pillar 3 reporting by individual banks.
a The Figure illustrates 5%, 25%, 75% and 95% percentiles for risk weights of the above mentioned European banks. Two exceptions have been considered in 
the sample: RWA for the mortgage portfolio of HSBC and for the credit card portfolio of Crédit Suisse. 
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reason, it could be useful to look at dispersion of risk weights in both standard and IRB 
models in order to assess if differences have increased under IRB models. 
In Chart 13, two measures of dispersion are included: the range between the maximum 
and minimum value and the standard deviation. They are both calculated for IRB and 
standard models for thirteen banks in Europe, focusing on two portfolios: corporations 
and mortgages. Results show significant dispersion under both standard and IRB models 
and a more puzzling lack of a common pattern of behaviour in these two portfolios. 
In the case of corporations, dispersion of risk weights in IRB models is higher than that of 
standard models. In theory, this result possibly fits the expected outcome better: arguably, 
IRB models are supposed to increase dispersion due to both a more accurate measure of 
risk profiles and greater room for discretion in model choices and in model validation 
processes. However, in the mortgage portfolio, the outcome is exactly the opposite with 
lower dispersion shown in IRB models. Different explanations could be found for this result. 
First, differences in risk profiles could be significant, thereby justifying to a greater extent 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100  
INSTITUTIONS  CORPORATES MORTGAGES  CREDIT CARDS  OTHERS-RETAIL 
    
D
ef
au
lt 
ra
te
 fo
r 
di
ffe
re
nt
 p
or
tfo
lio
s  
% of risk weights in IRB models for different portfolios 
Source: Pillar 3 reporting by individual banks. 
RISK WEIGHTS AND DEFAULT RATE FOR DIFFERENT PORTFOLIOS IN IRB MODELS IN 2010 CHART 12
%
Source: Pillar 3 reporting by individual banks.
a Calculations are based on detailed information reported by thirteen European banks: Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Santander, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria,
BNP, Crédit Agricole, Société Générale, Intesa San Paolo, Unicredito, Royal Bank of Scotland, HSBC, Barclays and Lloyds.  
0
10 
20 
30 
40
50
%
 
Corporations Mortgages 
 STANDARD MODEL- RANGE  IRB MODEL- RANGE  STANDARD MODEL- STANDARD DEVIATION  IRB MODEL - STANDARD DEVIATION 
  
 
MEASURES OF DISPERSION (STANDARD DEVIATION AND RANGE) OF RWA IN IRB AND STANDARD 
MODELS FOR CORPORATIONS AND MORTGAGES (a) 
CHART 13
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 57 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 21
the dispersion of RWA found in IRB models. Moreover, conversely to intuition, IRB models 
could have contributed to mitigating these differences. This could question the role of 
further discretion in these models. Second, the roll-out towards IRB models has given rise 
to a geographical bias in the coverage of both models: IRB models cover mostly European 
exposures, whereas standard models focus on other countries, with different risk profiles. 
The type of exposures could also be different in both kinds of models, which affects the 
final RWA, due to diverse treatment of commercial and residential exposures. All these 
factors make the comparability of dispersion of both types of models unfair and keep open 
the question of additional factors, other than risk profiles, affecting the level of RWA in IRB 
models. Finally, regulatory discretion at domestic level could also play a role in standard 
models with, for example, different risk weights considered for mortgages with the same 
loan-to-value (LTV) in different countries, due to the lack of uniformity in LTV thresholds 
across jurisdictions in the implementation of standard models. Disentangling all these 
factors is not an easy task, but it seems unavoidable in order to identify the relative weight 
of different factors in current RWA divergences, and, in particular, in order to gauge if risk 
profiles could be considered the main determinant of RWA divergences across banks. 
Decisions taken by each bank in order to manage and compute risks are an important factor, 
mainly after Basel II has allowed for more appropriate risk measurement. Different policies 
across banks in terms of credit analysis, monitoring and recovery, and tools for discriminating 
clients/operations according to risk appetite have an impact on main risk parameters, and, in 
particular on PD and LGD, thereby playing a crucial role in the assessment of RWA. Recovery 
practices make an important difference across financial institutions. Very often we observe 
that when different banks share a loan to the same firm, RWA are lower for those banks with 
a higher recovery rate than for others. Therefore, banks will benefit from their recovery track 
record and, in this way, achieve a lower risk weight in these syndicate operations. 
Since the implementation of IRB models following Basel II, modeling choices have become 
another strategic variable in gauging risk management. The quality and quantity of historical 
portfolio data or the features of some portfolios make methodological choices very 
important in the assessment of risk. In the understanding that these modeling choices are 
prudent and respect the principles of an accurate risk assessment, they could constitute 
justifiable divergences across banks. 
Whereas risk management as a whole is most likely not very important in magnitude in 
justifying divergences in RWA across banks, it creates incentives for innovation in risk 
technologies and IT systems and for advances in risk monitoring and recovery practices. 
Arguably, its benefits could compensate any potential shortcoming. Quantification of these 
factors is even more difficult than that of risk profile, thereby requiring detailed information 
of risk management from different institutions. 
The recognition of an important role for supervision in risk assessment constitutes an 
important advance in Basel II. Approval and validation processes of IRB models become a 
privileged learning experience for both banks and supervisors involved in these processes. 
This is especially true for global banks that have to deal with different supervisors in the 
various jurisdictions where they are located. They also have the opportunity to be aware of 
the differences in approval and validation processes and, particularly, of their potential 
impact on RWA differences across countries. 
In their brief existence, IRB models have contributed to a better understanding and 
measurement of risk. With the cumulative experience of this period, it is time for revisiting 
3.2 RISK MANAGEMENT
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some practices which will help to achieve greater consistency in RWA across jurisdictions. 
With some perspective, and based on the experience of global banks, it is feasible to 
identify a comprehensive list of factors that, during the validation and approval processes 
of IRB models, increase the divergences in the calculation of RWA. In order to be effective, 
it is preferable to focus on some specific factors that most likely play the main role in these 
discrepancies. Chief among them are the following: 
First, different criteria for cycle adjustment are applied in different jurisdictions. Some 
jurisdictions use through-the-cycle models in their assessment of PD, while others choose 
point-in-time methodologies and some others implement hybrid approaches. Common 
criteria for cycle adjustment will increase consistency. Moreover, changes in the methodology 
of cycle adjustment within a single bank over time should be avoided in order to prevent 
undue distortions from occurring.
Second, the establishment of minimum criteria for the acceptance of IRB models for some 
activities will lead to greater harmonization across countries. 
Third, the definition of downturn becomes an important factor. The calculation of downturn 
LGD and EAD poses a challenge for most financial institutions and supervisors. Several 
approaches have been put in place using different cyclical indicators as reference, e.g., 
GDP growth and output gap. One case in point is mortgage portfolios for which different 
variables have been used in order to gauge the downturn in the housing market. Following 
the experience of recent years, a review of current methodologies should be conducted, 
assessing whether these calculations make sense or not across different jurisdictions. 
Fourth, differences between expected losses and provisions across countries create 
differences between local and consolidated ratios for global banks. As a matter of fact, the 
treatment of non-performance loans has been extremely diverse across countries, giving 
rise to significant divergences in total RWA. 
Fifth, in the segmentation of portfolios included in IRB models, there is a trade-off between 
data availability and richness versus data homogeneity. For that reason, some supervisors 
prefer a broader sample of data in each segment, thereby splitting the portfolio into a 
limited number of segments; whereas others tend to choose a greater number of segments, 
each with a limited number of data points but with a high degree of homogeneity. As a 
result, there is a distinction between models with a limited number of PD buckets with no 
direct relationship with ratings versus those with a one-on-one relationship between 
ratings and PDs. This makes comparability across RWA unfair.
Finally, global banks located in different countries will benefit from common criteria for the 
methodology and approval of models for global portfolios (e.g., sovereign debt, financial 
institutions, global corporations). Supervisory colleges will play a major role in this process, 
limiting room for discretion at domestic level. 
Most of these divergences could be adjusted with the adoption of specific common guidelines, 
a process that would strongly benefit from information-sharing among supervisors, as 
explained in the next section. 
After reviewing the main determinants of RWA, the main conclusion is that divergences in 
RWA are to some extent justifiable due to different risk profiles and risk management. 
However, gauging the appropriate magnitude of these divergences at international level will 
4  Proposals for 
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probably take time and will require a more complex analytical framework than that used by 
FSA (2010) consisting of the calibration of a benchmark portfolio by different financial 
institutions. Institutional and macroeconomic factors, absent in the FSA approach, will play 
a significant role in explaining divergences in RWA across countries. Moreover, business 
mix and risk management, both across banks and over time, will also have to be calibrated 
in a comprehensive framework. Quantification of all these factors will require detailed and 
comparable information coming from different financial institutions and jurisdictions. 
Having recognized this difficulty, the need for greater consistency in RWA in a tougher 
framework for capital requirements constitutes a good incentive for improvement. This 
reality has been recognized by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision by endorsing 
the SIG to conduct a working group on RWA. Feasible targets, achievable in a relatively 
short period of time, are desirable in order to make some tangible and useful progress. 
Chief among them are the following: 
First, enhancing more comparable disclosure in Pillar 3 is crucial. This would lead to greater 
market discipline, and, as a result, would enhance greater consistency across banks and 
jurisdictions. A cross-country monitoring process, as suggested by Tarullo (2011), also 
requires comparable information on RWA among different exposures. The forthcoming 
Basel III constitutes a good opportunity to enhance this target. As most institutions at global 
level are willing to adopt the new regulatory framework, specific common guidelines will 
allow institutions to improve disclosure of Pillar 3, making it more comparable across banks. 
This process could constitute part of their preparation during the phasing-in period. 
Second, supervisors could contribute to making RWA more consistent through information-
sharing. The cumulative experience of the last three years in dealing with IRB models will 
be extremely helpful. As far as validation and approval processes for these models become 
harmonized at cross-country level, the subsequent outcome could be a reduction in undue 
discrepancies in RWA. 
Several approaches should be adopted in order to achieve more consistent practices 
among supervisors. Tarullo (2011) suggests three alternative possibilities: quantifiable 
comparison of standards implementation through benchmark portfolios, validation teams 
under the auspices of the Basel Committee, and collaboration of national supervisors in 
examining specific institutions. In this sense, a global solution will require information-
sharing between banks and supervisors and among supervisors themselves, agreement 
on the main issues to be fixed in validation and approval processes of IRB models (such 
as those mentioned above) and finally, the definition of very specific common guidelines 
on these particular issues. In this way, greater consistency in supervisory practices could 
be achieved going forward. Mechanisms for greater interplay among supervisors could 
also be implemented through reinforcement of an open dialogue on this issue within the 
supervisory colleges, particularly in the case of global banks. These mechanisms could be 
implemented at both global and European level.
In addition, some regulatory measures will also provide a useful backstop for existing RWA 
divergences. This is the case of the leverage ratio, calculated on the basis of total assets 
(with some adjustments) and not of RWA. Considered in isolation, this ratio could arguably 
be considered as a step backward from Basel II and from recent advances in an appropriate 
measurement of risk. Despite these doubts, it could be useful as a complementary tool in 
order to deal with differences in RWA across financial institutions. In this way, it limits the 
behavior of some banks that could increase assets and, simultaneously, keep capital 
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relatively stable if they have a low RWA density, whereas others institutions in the same 
situation could add capital in a significant amount due to their high RWA density. As a 
result, the inclusion of the leverage ratio into Pillar 1 will allow for safeguarding the level 
playing field for all institutions. Finally, although under this definition, the leverage ratio will 
be helpful, it does not constitute an excuse for lack of advances in the above-mentioned 
proposals in order to achieve further consistency of RWA. 
Consistency of RWA becomes a priority in a world of tougher capital requirements, and 
most likely, increasing competition for capital. However, feasible targets should be 
considered in achieving this goal. Lack of empirical comprehensive analysis of the main 
drivers of RWA makes this task more difficult. In this article, we have provided empirical 
evidence of the behavior and main determinants of RWA. 
The persistent downward trend in RWA during the last decade and the long-lasting 
discrepancies across banks in RWA density are most likely not linked to a single factor, but 
to a combination of elements. In particular, the stability, even the reduction, shown by RWA 
density during the ongoing financial crisis has been a significant puzzle because of 
previous analyses forecasting greater pro-cyclicality due to the implementation of Basel II 
and, therefore, of IRB models. 
Risk profile could change over time, as banks deviate activity outside loans and, as a 
result, loans reduce their share in total assets. Deleveraging during the crisis has been very 
significant for a group of institutions. In a cross-sectional approach, evidence points to 
very different loan activity across banks in different countries, correlated to some extent to 
RWA density. In our view, the existence of different risk profiles is a justifiable reason for 
discrepancies in RWA. Risk management is another reasonable determinant of RWA 
differences. While we accept that discrepancies should exist, how large these discrepancies 
have to be is the main question. At the current stage, discrepancies in RWA seem to be 
large enough to be fully justifiable. 
In this sense, IRB models have been considered a factor that intensifies differences in RWA 
across banks. As shown in this article, most of these differences existed prior to the 
implementation of IRB models. Conversely, an important contribution of these models, 
apart from a more accurate risk measurement, is a better understanding of the nature of risk 
for both supervisors and banks. During their brief existence, IRB models have also allowed 
global banks were allowed of some divergences on validation and approval processes by 
supervisors in different jurisdictions. That is why a contribution to greater consistency of 
RWA could be the review of some of these practices and, taking advantage of the experience 
acquired during the last three years, to design common specific guidelines on questions 
such as the definition of downturn and cyclical adjustment. This will help to quickly advance 
in greater consistency in RWA well before the new regulatory framework comes into force. 
A precise quantification and analysis of all determinants of RWA will take time and will entail 
more information gathering than that publicly available. In this way, harmonization of Pillar 3 
disclosure is a pre-condition for a successful ensuing analysis of RWA. 
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